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STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondent in her Brief has discussed a number of
"facts" which are no longer relevant for purposes of appeal.
(Respondent's Brief, p.

2-11).

For example, Mrs. Nelson

states repeatedly throughout her statement of facts and in
the remaining portion of the brief that appellant American
Bonding Company essentially settled a $200,000 claim of AAA
Electric for only $30,000.

(Respondent's Brief, p.

9-11).

These statements concerning the alleged improper settlement
of the claim are completely irrelevant to this appeal since
neither Mrs. Nelson, Mr. Nelson, nor AAA Electric Service
has entered a cross-appeal regarding the propriety of the
lower court's judgment.

The Respondent also completely

ignores the findings of the lower court in which it was
found:
(1) That AAA and Keith Nelson failed to pursue these
claims to their own accord and failed to request American
Bonding Company to pursue such claims by posting adequate
security. (Finding of Fact No. 6 ) .
(2) That the sureties acted in good faith in paying
their claims. (Finding of Fact No. 7 ) .
(3) That while the sureties paid $87,667 in claims and
legal expenses, of that amount $61,410 was disallowed by the
lower court on the basis that there was insufficient
documentation to support the claims, thereby resulting in
a net judgment of only $26,257 in favor of the sureties.
(Finding of Fact Nos. 9 and 10).
(4) That the attorneys' fees charged by both Mr.
Vanetta's lawfirm and by the firm of Snow, Christensen and
Martineau are reasonable and recoverable under the
circumstances. (Finding of Fact Nos. 11 and 12).
Thus, the repeated arguments made throughout
Respondent's Brief concerning the "15 cents on the dollar"

-1-
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recovery by Appellant should be ignored.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE CLAIM
AGAINST DEFENDANT MAUREEN NELSON.
A.

The Terms of the Blanket Indemnity Agreement
Controlled and No Notice Was Therefore Required
Nor Was Participation in the Settlement
Negotiations Required.

Respondent in her brief argues that the terms of the
contract implicitly reuired that notice of all claims be
given to her before she assumed any liability.
(Respondent's Brief, pp. 11-20).

She relies upon the

finding of the lower court that paragraph 13 of the
agreement created an implicit requirement of notice and
cites the lower court's reasoning that "otherwise the
provisions of the indemnity agreement would have no
meaning."

(Respondent's Brief, p. 12).

The decision is wrong for two reasons.

First, there is

no reason why the Principal and Indemnitor must receive
notice from the Surety in order to post the required bond.
They can learn through a number of ways including demands by
creditors, service in lawsuits, etc.

Certainly the

Principal should know of claims being asserted against him.
Does paragraph 13 require that he give notice to the
Indemnitors?
Second, both Respondent and the lower court have
ignored basic principles of contract interpretation.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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Paragraph 11 of the Indemnity Agreement specifically
provided that no notice of any kind need be given to the
indemnitors and, further, that the "indemnitors shall be and
continue liable hereunder, notwithstanding any defense they
might have been entitled to make."
If paragraph 13 relating to settlements is read to
explicity require notice before liability can be imposed
against Respondent, then such provision would effectively
annihilate the specific language contained in the 11th
paragraph.

It is fundamentail that contractual provisions

which apparently conflict must be reconciled, if a
reconciliation can be effected by any reasonable
interpretation, before a court adopts a construction that
would nullify any provision of the contract,

Shepard v.

Tophat Land & Cattle Co., 560 P.2d 730 (Wyo.

1977).

Here,

to adopt the position taken by the lower court completely
nullifies the language in the 11th paragraph.
It is also fundamental that in contract cases if there
is an inconsistency between clauses the specific provisions
qualify the meaning of the general provisions.

Brisco v.

Merit Plan Insurance Co., 643 P.2d 1042 (Ariz.

1982).

This

doctrine has been adopted by the courts on the basis that
specific provisions in contracts express more exactly what
the parties intended than do general clauses or clauses
where implications are made.

Desbien v. Penokee Farmers

Union Co-op Assn., 552 P.2d 917 (Kan.

1976).

Paragraph 13 of the Indemnity Agreement allows the

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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principals and the indemnitors to require the surety to
litigate a claim, provided the principal and indemnitors
post sufficient funds to cover the cost of defense.

Whether

this clause implicitly states that notice will be given to
the principal and indemnitors misses the point.

Even if it

did, the 11th paragraph clearly states that the principal
and indemnitors cannot escape liability because of the
failure to give such notice.
In Cessna Finance Corp.

v. Meyer, 575 P.2d 1048

(Utah 1978) this Court interpreted a case involving a very
similar provision in a guarantee agreement.

The language in

the guarantee agreement stated that the guarantor waived
notice of default and all other notices "to which Guarantor
might otherwise be entitled in connection with this
guarantee."

This Court stated:

The waiver provision signed by the appellant
above covered every kind of notice that the
guarantor would ordinarily be entitled to receive.
Appellant was not taken by surprise, he was
dealing at arm's length and intelligently and
knowingly waived notice. Despite that waiver
provision, however, Respondent still tendered
notice to make sure the guarantors were adequately
and fairly informed of all aspects of the default,
repossession, and sale of the collateral. In
light of the waiver and respondent's subsequent
fair dealing, it appears that Appellant has no
basis for contending that he did not receive
adequate notice in this matter. Id. at 1052.
Thus, even if paragraph 13 of the Indemnity Agreement
implied or suggested that notice be sent to the indemnitor
and the principal concerning the claims, paragraph 11
specifically provided that the failure to send such
notice in no way negated any liability of the principal or
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library,
- 4 - J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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the indemnitors.

The two clauses are therefore not

inconsistent and the lower court was in error in concluding
that paragraph 13 required notice to be sent and that
failure to send such notice allowed Respondent to escape all
liability.
B.

Assuming Arguendo that Notice Was
Required Then the Notice Given to Maureen
Nelson was Sufficient.

Even if it is assumed that paragraph 13 required that
notice be given to Maureen Nelson of the claim, and even if
it is assumed that paragraph 11 is not applicable in
excusing any failure to give adequate notice, the lower
court was still incorrect in concluding that Respondent did
not receive proper notice.

Findings of Fact No. 2 merely

concluded that the notice to Maureen Nelson was vague and
insufficient and "did not afford her reasonable notice as to
whether she should exercise the right to defend under
paragraph 13."
The court in its oral decision acknowledged that
Respondent received or should be charged with receiving the
November 19, 1975 letters which were sent to Respondent.
The evidence was uncontested that Appellant sent to her not
only a letter in her own name but also a copy of the letter
sent to her husband.

(Ex. D, Ex. C). The court in

concluding that these notices were insufficient stated the
following:
It simply recites generaly that claims have
been asserted against the bonding company in
connection with these jobs. The letter itself
does not cite who the claimants are, does not
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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indicate the amount of the claims, the nature of
the claims, doesn't indicate the peril in which
the indemnitors find themselves, and the court
would conclude that one cannot be intelligently
put on notice from that letter as to what it is
that they are defending on, so would conclude that
that does not satisfy the reasonable intent of the
agreement. Accordingly, I would grant the motion
to dismiss Mrs. Nelson. (Tr. 287).
Since there is no express provision in the contract
relating to notice, and since the lower court based its
requirement purely upon an implied notice requirement of
paragraph 13, it is difficult to understand the source of
the various elements listed by the lower court in claiming a
deficiency of notice.

Certainly the letters sent to Mrs.

Nelson indicated that claims were being asserted against the
bond and that she had previously agreed to hold American
Bonding Company harmless from any loss it would sustain as a
result of paying claims.

The letter to Mr. Nelson, a copy

of which she was also sent, stated the name, address and
phone number of the attorney handling the claims.

Any of

the information listed by the lower court in its decision
could have been easily obtained had Mrs. Nelson merely
contacted Mr. Vanetta.
This Court has held in several instances that the
substance of the notice must be examined over its form and
that as long as a person is given an adequate opportunity to
assert his rights under the terms of a contract, any
technical deficiency in the notice will be overlooked.
Scharf v. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 1068 (Utah 1985);
Pioneer Dodge Center Inc.

v. Glaubensklee, 649 P.2d 28

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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(Utah 1982); FMA Financial Corp.

v. Pro Printers, 590

P.2d 803 (Utah 1979).
The lower court in its findings also noted that Mrs.
Nelson was not kept informed about the negotiations which
occurred between the parties after the initial notice was
sent, that she was not made a part of the takeover
agreement, nor was it submitted to her for approval.
(Finding of Fact No. 4). This finding is completely
unjustified in that there is nothing even under the implicit
interpretation of paragraph 13 to require an indemnitor to
be made an active party in the settlement proceedings. The
only right which exists to an indemnitor is the ability to
post a security for the defense of the claim, thereby
requiring the surety to defend rather than compromise.
Certainly once the indemnitor has been notified of the claim
it is the burden of the indemnitor to monitor the
negotiations and to decide if this option of defense should
be utilized.

An indemnitor under this agreement would have

no right to demand that he or she be made a party to a
takeover compromise.
C•

Even if it is Assumed Arguendo that
Maureen Nelson Received Insufficient Notice
She Made no Showing of Any Prejudice.

Appellant contends, of course, that Mrs. Nelson
received notice which was adequate to inform her of the
claims being asserted.

In addition, any deficiency in such

notice was waived by Mrs. Nelson in the Indemnity Agreement.
However, even assuming that neither of these arguments is

-7-
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valid, it is still incumbent upon Mrs. Nelson to show
prejudice caused by the failure to properly notify her.
Respondent attacks the proposition that a showing of
prejudice is necessary before the absence of proper notice
can be used as a defense under the terms of the Indemnity
Agreement.

(Respondent's Brief, p. 20-24).

Respondent

cites the case of Aetna Bank v. Hollister as an
authority relied upon by Appellant.
21).

(Respondent's Brief, p.

This statement is incorrect since Appellant relied

only upon the C.J.S. citation and not upon its cited
authorities.

In addition, the automobile insurance cases

relied upon by Appellant are still controlling in spite of
Respondent's efforts to distinguish them, since they all
hold that mere lack of notice alone does not allow escape
from a contractual liability agreement.

(Appellant's brief

in chief, pp. 15-16).
There is no showing in the record that Respondent
suffered any prejudice as a result of the supposed lack of
notice required by the contract, no proffer was made by
Respondent that she would have or could have done anything
differently had she been advised of every fact or been
invited to every negotiation which took place.

Under the

terms of the agreement Appellant was authorized to
compromise and settle the claims unless the indemnitor
specifically posted enough funds to cover the defense of the
litigation.

No evidence was introduced by Respondent that

such funds were available or even that she would have

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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attempted to raise such funds had she been notified.
In Pioneer Dodge Center, inc.

v. Glaubensklee, 649

P.2d 28 (Utah 1982), the debtor received notice that her
repossessed truck would be auctioned off at 11:00 a.m. on a
specified day; instead, the truck was sold at 10:00 a.m.
Because the debtor did not show up at 11:00 a.m., this Court
held that she was not prejudiced by the error.

Likewise,

there is no prejudice shown in this case by Respondent's
alleged failure to receive notice.
Respondent acknowledges that the "more recent and
better reasoned cases" have held that where an indemnitor
has not been given notice of the suit against his
indemnitee, the failure of notice changes the burden of
proof and imposes upon the indemnitee the necessity of again
litigating and establishing actionable facts that the
original obligee had against the principal.
Brief, p.

(Respondent's

17). Although Respondent denies that this

occurred in the instant case, a review of the record shows
differently.
The remaining ten days of trial concerned a rehashing
of all the various claims asserted by the parties against
AAA Electric and by AAA's claims for additional
compensation.

Effectively, the appellant was required to

justify all of the claims and offsets that were paid or
credited during the dispute.

As is evidenced by Findings of

Fact Nos. 8 and 9, the lower court disallowed an offset of
$61,410 which the government had claimed against AAA

-9-
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Electric and which the appellant had paid to the government
based upon those assertions.

Thus, Appellant lost $61,410

in this lawsuit because the lower court felt that the
underlying facts of the original claim had not been proven.
For this reason, therefore, because Respondent was
represented by the same attorney representing AAA Electric
she was given the opportunity to challenge all of the claims
being asserted against her and AAA Electric in the original
settlement agreement and even under Respondent's own
authorities cannot now rely upon a notice deficiency to
escape liability upon those claims which the lower court
found to be valid.

Essentially, Maureen Nelson was given

her day in court as provided by Section 13 of the Agreement
and was able to effectively eliminate a large portion of the
claimed deficiency even though it was paid by Appellant in
good faith.
POINT II
THE ACTIONS OF THE BONDING COMPANY IN
SETTLING THE CLAIMS AGAINST AAA ELECTRIC
WAS NOT A DISPOSITION OF COLLATERAL
UNDER THE UCC.
Respondent contends that the Indemnity Agreement was a
security interest under Colorado law which required the
procedures outlined in Sections 4-9-504 of the Colorado
Revised Statutes.

(Respondent's Brief, pp. 24-26).

argument is without merit.

Such

First, Section 9-504 of the UCC

is inapplicable to this situation.

Second, even if it were,

adequate notice was given.
Section 9-504 of the Colorado Revised Statutes is
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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identical to Section 70A-9-504 of the Utah Code Annotated.
Both of these sections are inapplicable to the present case
since (1) there was never a sale or disposal of any
collateral, and (2) there were no third parties involved in
any transaction.
There was no sale or other disposal of collateral as is
contemplated by Section 9-504.

Appellant stepped into the

shoes of AAA Electric and essentially paid its obligations
and settled its debts.

Respondent has cited no cases

holding that an indemnitee which settles against the
creditors of an indemnitor is disposing of collateral under
the UCC.

There simply are no cases to this effect.

Second, there were no third parties involved.

The

debts were settled between the original parties to the
various contracts.

There was no sale or auction involving

non-contracting parties who in any way were affected by
these settlements.

In the Willey v. Bank of Fountain

Valley case cited by Respondent (p. 26) the actual sale of
a promissory note to a third party occurred.
was neither a sale nor a third party.

Here, there

The case is

completely irrelevant to the present conflict.
Even if this Indemnification Agreement is considered a
security, there was still reasonable notice under the terms
of the commercial code and no showing of prejudice was made
by Respondent because of such lack of notice.
Finance Corp.

Cessna

v. Meyer, 575 P.2d 1048 (Utah 1978);

Scharf v. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 1068 (Utah 1985).

-11-
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For these reasons, therefore, Respondent's claim based
upon the Uniform Commercial Code must fail.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY APPLIED A "GOOD
FAITH STANDARD" AND NOT A "COMMERCIALLY
REASONABLE STANDARD."
Finally, Respondent contends that Section 9-502 of the
Colorado Revised Statutes applies in this case and that for
Appellant to prevail it was encumbent upon it to show that
it had proceeded in a commercially reasonable manner.
(Respondent's Brief, pp. 27-28).

This argument again

ignores the clear language of the contract as well as the
existing laws concerning indemnification agreement.
The Indemnity Agreement in the third paragraph,
entitled "Indemnity," provides that:
The surety shall be entitled to charge for
any and all disbursements made by it in good faith
in and about the matters herein contemplated by
this agreement under the belief that it is or was
liable for the sum or sums so disbursed, or that
it was necessary or expedient to make such
disbursements, whether or not such liability,
necessity or expediency existed; and that the
vouchers or other evidence of any such payments
made by the surety shall be prima facie evidence
of the fact and amount of the liability to the
surety. (Emphasis added).
The lower court found that the sureties had acted in
good faith in paying the claims and in making disbursements
on such claims and that they should be reimbursed as to
those claims which were supported by vouchers.

(Finding No.

7).
The language contained in the indemnification agreement
is standard in the industry and courts interpreting such
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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agreements have always held that the good faith standard is
the correct one.

Courts have universally held that an

indemnitor may attack the payments of an indemnitee only
upon the showing of fraud or a lack of good faith by the
surety.

United States Fidelity & Surety Co.

v. Napier

Electric & Construction Co., 571 S.W.2d 644 (Ky.

1978);

Hess v. American States Insurance Co., 389 S.W.2d 548 (Tex.
App.

1979); Transamerican Ins.

F.2d 357 (6th Cir.

Co.

v. Bloomfield, 401

1968).

This rule of good faith is grounded upon sound public
policy.

If sureties were bound to be right in the

settlement of each claim, whether in defending a
materialman's suit, contesting an owner's offset, or
prosecuting the principal's extras, then tactics would
dictate in most cases that each matter be litigated with the
principal joined in the same action in order to obtain a
consistent result and thus avoid "Monday Morning
Quarterbacking" by the principal.
As noted earlier, Respondent's attempt to place this
litigation under the terms of the UCC must fail, since
neither a sale of collateral nor third parties were involved
in these transactions.

In addition, the impracticality of

applying the UCC Code to an indemnification agreement can be
seen by examining Respondent's arguments.

How does a party

prove that a claim has been settled and compromised in a
commercially reasonable manner?

In other words, there is

simply no commercial standard for the settling of lawsuits

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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and claims as there is for the selling and disposal of goods
and other security interests.
For these reasons, therefore, the lower court was
correct in applying the contractual language of good faith
and in finding that the appellant did in fact exercise such
good faith in the settlement of these claims*
CONCLUSION
Respondent has attempted to infuse a number of
irrelevant factual claims into an otherwise simple factual
dispute.

Respondent has chosen those portions of the

court's decision in her favor to argue vigorously and has
ignored other portions of the decision which are against her
interests.

Respondent has not filed a cross-appeal in this

case and therefore is necessarily bound by the entire
decision rendered by the lower court, both favorable and
unfavorable to her position now.

Thus the repeated claims

throughout Respondent's brief that the appellant wrongfully
compromised the claims at a fraction of their true value
should be struck from the arguments raised in this appeal.
As to notice, it is clear that the Indemnification
Agreement, while not precluding the giving of notice, did
preclude a defense based upon the failure to receive notice
or adequate notice.

In any event, adequate notice was given

to Respondent of the claim and her failure to reasonably
pursue the potential claims cannot be charged against
Appellant.

In addition, she has been unable to show any

prejudice which occurred because of the alleged inadquate
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notice.
Finally, the provisions of the UCC relied upon by
Respondent simply are not applicable to the facts of this
case involving an indemnification agreement.

Regarding

notice, however, even if such provisions were applicable,
the requirements have been met.

As to the standard of

review, it is apparent that a "commercially reasonable"
standard cannot be utilized in indemnification cases since
there is no commercially reasonable standard in compromising
and settling disputes.
For these reasons, therefore, the judgment of the lower
court should be reversed as a matter of law and judgment
entered against Respondent Maureen Nelson.
Dated this UJCL day of April, 1987.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
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